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Social Movements and Democratization in South Africa.1
Conventional theoretical wisdom in South African studies in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s
was that South Africa could not democratize peaceably. That wisdom was informed by the
insights of conflict modernization theory. Conflict modernization theorists suggested that
modernization exacerbated ascriptive social divisions which come to be reflected in the polity.
Ascriptive politics, ethnic, religious, or racial, tended to degenerate into zero-sum political
conflicts: political gain for one group implied loss for the other. States whose polities were so
divided, Israel, Northern Ireland, Lebanon and most of all South Africa, were considered most
unlikely candidates for democratization. When applied to South Africa, conflict modernization
theorists have argued that South Africa was (and is?) embroiled in a struggle between
white/Afrikaner nationalism, primarily embodied in the National Party (NP) and African2
nationalism in the African National Congress (ANC). Both have mobilized for self-determination.
Afrikaner nationalism has articulated this claim in the form of ethnonationalism; African
nationalism through an anti-colonial struggle for independence.3
Events of 1990 and beyond have led conflict modernization theorists to shift levels of analysis.
While not abandoning the deeply divided society metaphor, they have turned to the "transitions
literature" to investigate democratization. Transitions theorists eschew theoretical explanation,
content to describe democratization in terms of elite actions amidst contingent events. The
image of democratization provided in transition theory is one where democratic pacts are
imposed onto the political structure by a cabal of moderate elites. Consonant with this image
is the notion that the election of 1994 be regarded as merely a "racial census." Paradoxically,
conflict modernization theorists fail to explain how the same elites whose group affiliation
made them unrelenting antagonists became the democratizing moderates. Democratization as
a political—and especially a social—outcome remains mysteriously unexplained.
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 This paper is part of my ongoing dissertation research into the forces that made democratic transition
possible. The other key aspect of my research is on the transformation of the National Party. This
involves the transformation in the identity of the former ruling NP. This transformation involved the
complex unfolding of class, racial and ethnic interests that had been part of the party's past. The
central thrust of this transformation was from one of racial and ethnic exclusion to inclusion, as the NP
moved from being a populist Afrikaner ethnonationalist party to one dominated by broader white
racial concerns coupled with conservative class ones. Finally, the party dropped its racial exclusivism,
and became multiracial. This made it possible for the NP elite to accommodate from above to demands
for racial inclusion from below.
* For purposes of analytical consistency, African, Indian and Coloured refer to members of different
racial groups as classified by the apartheid state. Black refers to all three groups combined.
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 This perspective is advanced most forcefully by Hermann Giliomee. My thinking on South Africa and
its transition has been deeply influenced by Giliomee's work, and while at variance to his overall
conclusions, is deeply indebted to the insights it contains.
From a sociological perspective, this is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. Even if it were
true that the election of 1994 were simply a racial census (a conclusion which I would dispute),
social researchers are no closer to understanding how a deeply divided polity could have had
such an election in the first place. It is not that the descriptive insights of transition theory are
incorrect: elite agreements through compromise have been crucial to democratization. It is,
rather, the theoretical assumption that transition theorists have made, without empirical
investigation, that compromise was possible without other significant political changes in and
between the crucial political contenders. Hence the central problem for this paper will be to
understand what made the democratic transition in South Africa possible with a focus on the
impact of the social movement activities "from below."
The central thrust of my argument is that democratization was made possible by the construction
of an incipient inclusivist nation-building project under the rubric of the United Democratic Front
(UDF) for equal political participation in central government institutions. UDF's success was in
its ability to mobilize local level developmental grievances into national level political ones
through the ideology of non-racialism. Its activity constituted a limited 'revolution against racism'
of the exclusive state and forced more inclusive constitutional changes onto the state's reform
agenda. Non-racialism made it possible to shift the center of political struggle away from zero-
sum identity conflicts onto developmental class ones. While the deep racial, class, and ethnic
divisions remain in South African society, they are, at least for the time being, marginalized from
the key conflicts in the national state. The future of South African democracy depends largely on
the ability of the political parties to maintain that distance from those identity-based concerns,
while dealing with some of the underlying developmental inequalities.
The implications of South Africa's democratization, theoretically and empirically, are profound.
Democratization occurred despite the fact that South Africa was and is deeply divided socially.
This suggests that it is not in the large-scale structural divisions that democratic projects are either
constructed or destroyed, but in the manner in which the collective actors respond to the various
alternatives that they present. Democratization through non-racialism was one such project.
1. Conflict Modernization Theory and the Character of the South African Conflict
The theoretical literature on communal strife is replete with conflicting attempts to characterize
group political conflicts. Two theoretical orientations to the problem of the persistence of group
conflict in modern societies dominate the literature. The first argues that identity conflicts are
rooted in the premodern, where ties of blood and family dominate the organization of social and
political life. Such theorists were all convinced that modernization itself would replace such
traditional identities with newer, more rational ones (Apter 1967; Huntington 1968). The sheer
persistence of communal conflicts, even in developed countries, casts doubt on the central
assumptions of modernization theory.
Social theorists responded by searching for new basic principles for understanding group politics
in modernizing societies, and found it in the conception of divided societies whose members share
nothing besides territory, markets, and the state (Furnivall 1948; Kuper and Smith 1971). The
organizing principle for such societies is coercion, as a distinct cultural group gains control of the
state and uses it to maintain its ascendancy. These conceptual assumptions became the organizing
principles for a new generation of Conflict Modernization theorists (Newman 1991). In this
paradigm, modernization does not diminish ascriptive cleavages but exacerbates them. Racial
conflict occurred because previously isolated racial groups are brought together in cities through
industrialization and urbanization. Competition for the same economic niches creates ascriptive
antagonisms. In such divided societies, politics becomes dominated by intractable identity issues.
The state becomes dominated by one party with particularistic claims (Connor 1977; 1987; 1990;
Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Greenberg 1980; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977; 1985; 1989).
Democracy is a highly unlikely outcome.
The theory of conflict modernization became fashionable for analyzing South African politics in
the late 1970s and 1980s. Following the logic of the theory, South Africa's racial conflict emerged
from the Nineteenth century settler society. Early industrialization led to a horizontal split
between black and white, and a vertical split between Afrikaner and English whites (Adam and
Giliomee 1979; Greenberg 1980; Giliomee and Schlemmer 1990). Reflecting Afrikaner political
marginalization under successive pro-British governments, Afrikaner ethnonationalism developed
in the 1930s. It's success was predicated on a vision for Afrikaner triumph against English
domination and African threat. In 1948, the NP won state power through a narrow electoral
victory. With successive elections, the NP's proportion of electoral votes rose to a high of 65%,
with over 90% support by Afrikaners in 1977. Accompanying electoral success was apartheid:
state policy advancing Afrikaner ethnonational interests and white privilege through black
exclusion and superexploitation. Large-scale industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s exacerbated
divisions between black and white, though it ameliorated differences between Afrikaner and
English speakers (Connor 1990; Giliomee 1989; Giliomee and Schlemmer 1990; Horowitz 1991).
The NP entered the turbulent 1980s with a broader racial-national concern for the self-
determination of the white community.
In the case of the ANC, Giliomee argues that it is a movement similar in goals and ideology to
other African liberation movements. These movements were defined in their struggle against
colonial oppressors. Their principle aim was national liberation through the eviction of the
colonizers. Mobilization against the colonial administration subordinated ethnic concerns to
national ones: it was a people's struggle for independence. Giliomee, for example, recognizes that
other political tendencies exist within the ANC, namely a workerist socialism, and a democratic
liberalism. However, he clearly states that the dominant political tendency is that of anti-colonial
nationalism. In sum, by the 1980s, the struggle in South Africa was between a white racial-
nationalism and a black anti-colonialism.
Because of the large-scale structural divisions between black and white South Africans, racial-
national theories made scholars pessimistic about prospects for peaceful change and
democratization (Connor 1990; Giliomee 1989; Giliomee 1990),4 De Klerk's bold move to
liberalize politics in 1990 caught many of these scholars by surprise. Without abandoning the
precepts of conflict modernization, some of these scholars turned to the transitions literature to
4
 Once important and perceptive exception to this conventional wisdom has been the work of Heribert
Adam and Koogila Moodley (Adam 1971; Adam and Moodley 1986; Adam and Moodley 1993).
account for democratization (Giliomee et. al. 1994; Giliomee 1995; Giliomee 1996).
The transitions literature has been highly influenced by the theoretical orientation of American
political science with its emphasis on elites and formal institutions (Baloyra 1987; Burton and
Higley 1987; di Palma 1990; Etzioni-Halevy 1993; Geddes 1995; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986;
Przeworksi 1991; Sisk 1995; Wickham-Crowley 1994). For these scholars, democratization
occurs when moderate elites in the regime and its opposition win political struggles with radical
anti-democrats in their respective camps. The moderates in both camps then compromise
ideologically, and ally. The compromise is codified through pacts: negotiated agreements
circumscribing democratization through institutions protecting former elite power and privilege.
When the pacting process holds out against the radicals, democratization ensues.
The image of democratization embodied within transition theory is one of a settlement grafted
onto the polity from above by a cabal of moderate and compromising elites. Hence South Africa
has not democratized because the elites were consensually unified, a condition Rustow once
suggested was necessary (Rustow 1970). Even less so because there has been a fundamental
change in political terrain in the last decade. Instead, democratization has developed in South
Africa because the crucial contending elites "share an interest in preventing a slide into anarchy
and making the economy work for both blacks and whites" (Giliomee 1996, p. 25). The peaceful
election founding election of 1994 was nothing more than a racial census in which less that 5%
of the Black and White voters not voting for historically black and white parties (Giliomee 1994;
Schlemmer 1994; Johnson 1996).
Both Conflict Modernization and Transition theory leave scholars without an explanation for
democratization in the country. Even if the election of 1994 was merely a "racial census," what
has to be explained in view of South Africa's deep racial and class divisions is how that election
was possible in the first place. Simply suggesting that elites shared an interest in avoiding chaos
and reviving the economy merely begs the question of how such economic rationality became
injected into a polity theoretically assumed to be pervaded by communal irrationality.
Empirical evidence of the last six years points out the weakness of the assumptions of irrationality.
While it would be simplistic to suggest that the transitional outcome was predetermined
beforehand, the fact remains that negotiations to draft a new constitution were largely successful.
Scholars observing the activities of the negotiations have suggested that they represented a
convergence in the distance between the parties (Friedman 1993; Sisk 1995). Underlying that
convergence was a conflict less concerned with identities than with the distribution of good and
services. In short, class appeared to be the dominant cleavage of politically organized conflict in
post-apartheid South Africa.
Post 1994 analysis and evidence supports this observation. Analyses of the election of 1994 have
corroborated the observation that most South Africans voted in accordance with their ascriptive
racial characteristics. However, those same investigations have challenged the conclusion that
South Africans voted for those parties primarily because they represented their racial or ethic
concerns. In fact, in the case of supporters of the two largest parties, the ANC and NP
respectively, the evidence suggests that race and ethnicity consciousness and mobilization
represented minor concerns. Far more important were ideology, policy, and past and present
performance. Racial and ethnic concerns were more significant for the Inkatha Freedom Party,
the Pan Africanist Congress, and the Freedom Front (Mattes et. al. 1995). However, these parties
combined represent only approximately 15% of the voters in the 1994 election (Reynolds 1994).
Furthermore, in the two and half years since the election, there has been very little evidence of
overt racial and ethnic mobilization or conflict. Where present, it has been organized primarily by
the fringe elements of the Far Right. In addition, the final draft of the new democratic constitution
has recently been ratified by all parties in parliament who accord it highly as a consensus
document with high democratic content (Star December 5, 1996; Beeld 11 December 1996;
Sunday Times December 22, 1996). South African elites might not be consensually unified, but
they appear to overwhelmingly accept the democratic 'rules of the game.' How and why most of
these elites were able and willing to accept these new rules in such a divided society is what
remains to be answered.
2. Setting the Stage for Political Change: Modernization and Class Formation
Conflict modernization theorists have argued that modernization leads to exacerbation of
communal conflicts. In the aftermath of WWII, South African entered its most intensive phase of
modernization. Growth rates between 1946 and 1974 averaged 4.9% with peaks of 8.5% in 1963-
4. This is in start contrast to growth rates averaged only 1.8% between 1974 and 1989
(Crankshaw 1994, p. 131). The sizable growth rates up to 1974 set in motion massive changes
in the structure of the South African economy, levels of urbanization, occupational structure, and
education. Mining and agriculture declined drastically in sectoral contribution to the national
economy, while manufacturing and commerce showed large growth.
Levels of urbanization for whites increased from 58% to 88% between 1946 and 1985, Indians
from 56% to over 90%, Coloureds from 39% to 75%, and Africans from 18% to 32% for the
same period (Greenberg 1980, p. 422; RSA PC3/1985, pp. 32-34). Despite the determined efforts
of the apartheid state to prevent urbanization of the majority population, the urban population
exceeded the rural population in 1990 (Kane-Berman 1990, p. 8).
Economic development altered employment patterns. Especially notable in this respect is the
changing racial division of labor. In general, in the period up to 1974, whites moved into white-
collar jobs which became a source for Afrikaner upward mobility as shown below; in the period
after 1974, whites moved out of white-collar jobs into managerial, professional and supervisory
ones to the virtual exclusion of other races (Crankshaw 1994, p. 45). Coloureds and Africans, on
the other hand, moved into white-collar jobs in large numbers, For example, between 1965 and
1989, the numbers of Coloureds and Africans in white-collar jobs increased from approximately
30,000 to 100,000 and 100,000 to 450,000 respectively. Similar trends were evident in the semi-
professions. Here white employment increased from approximately 140,000 to 350,000 between
1965 and 1989, while African and Coloured numbers increased from 50,000 to 200,000 and
20,000 to 50,000 respectively. Finally, in the period 1965 to 1989, levels of artisanal employment
levels have been fairly stable for whites at approximately 175,000, while Coloured and Indian
levels have shown moderate increases from 22,000 to 45,000 and 2,000 to 14,000 respectively.
But African artisanal employment has shown spectacular growth from negligible levels in 1970
to over 50,000 in 1989 (Crankshaw 1989, pp. 41-45).
Perhaps nowhere are the effects of modernization more evident than in education. White pupil
enrollment levels increase from approximately 700,000 to 1 million between the years 1958-1989,
Indian levels remained at roughly 100,000, and Coloureds increased from 200,000 to 800,000.
However, levels of African enrollment showed spectacular increases from 1.5 million to 5 million
(Crankshaw 1994, p. 126).
Aggregate figures for white occupational distribution conceal what is perhaps the most astounding
change of all; the impact of apartheid on the disparity between English and Afrikaans speakers.
In 1946, 30.3% of Afrikaners were involved in agriculture; by 1977 this had declined to a mere
8.1%. Similarly, the percentage of Afrikaners in blue collar labor was 40.7% in 1946, dropping
to 26.7% in 1977. The shift out of agriculture and blue-collar work was complemented by a shift
into white-collar employment. In 1946, 29% of Afrikaners were employed in white collar jobs,
in 1977 this had risen to 65.2% (O'Meara 1996, p. 138). Afrikaner personal income consequently
grew quite phenomenally. In 1946, Afrikaner per capita income was 47% of that of English
speakers, while in 1977 it was 71%. Another important change was the percentage rise of
Afrikaner ownership in the private sector which more than doubled in the first twenty years of
Nationalist rule (Adam and Giliomee 1979, pp. 170-3).
Overall, South Africa's modernization patterns in the post war period have thoroughly urbanized
all but the African population. Even there, despite the attempts by the state to prevent African
urbanization, an urban black working class, and a smaller black middle class has developed.
Whites have consolidated their positions in the professional and managerial positions, while blacks
have moved in ever greater numbers into all other spheres of economic activity. Within the white
minority, the picture is one where the economic differences between Afrikaners and English
speakers have rapidly diminished. It should not be surprising if those economic changes eventually
impacted on the policies of the state, and the politics and social bases of the NP and its
opposition.
3. State Reform 'from above' and the Transformation of South African Politics
In the context of the pressures emanating from a modernizing economy, the state embarked on
a reform program with both internal and external components. Internal reform involved two
components: labor reform leading to black industrial citizenship, and constitutional changes
leading to the Tricameral parliament and associated local government development. The major
thrust externally was an attempt to secure the apartheid state in the context of anti-colonial
nationalist movements in the frontline states of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. Although an
extended discussion of the specific causes for these changes are beyond the scope of this paper,
it is probably a fair assessment to say that only labor reform can be directly attributed to internal
political pressures. Here the obvious contradictions between the state's apartheid policies which
did not recognize the permanence of the African urban population and the demands of a
modernizing economy were crucial. The state's willingness to implement some labor reform was
accelerated by wildcat labor strikes of 1973 which led to pressures from manufacturing capital to
modernize the labor framework (Alden 1996; Price 1991).
Guidelines for labor reform were developed by two government commissions, the Wiehahn
Committee of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, and the Riekert Committee of Inquiry into the
Utilization of Manpower. Combined, these argued for the recognition of black unions and that
urban blacks be accorded the right to work and own housing in 'white' South Africa. Underlying
both of these reports was an acceptance of the general principles of apartheid: that most blacks
were residents and citizens of the black homelands (Alden 1996; Price 1991). Hence they did not
challenge the overarching political dispensation within the country. Their significance,
undoubtedly not appreciated at the time, was in the manner in which their recommendations, once
implemented, facilitated the development of the non-racial labor unions. These unions were to
become critical political actors in the mid and late 1980s.
The only other attempt at internal reform in the mid 1970s was the Theron Commission of Inquiry
into the Coloured Population. This report delved into the socio-economic and political conditions
of the Coloured people, most of whom lived in the Western Cape. The commission reported in
1976, on the very day of the Soweto uprising. Although most of the social and economic
recommendations of the commission were accepted by the government, the constitutional
suggestions were not. Instead a cabinet committee was established to make alternative
recommendations. This committee and its forebears were the state organizations which drafted
the Tricameral parliament. However, this new constitutional dispensation was part of a much
grander strategic plan by new leader of the NP, P. W. Botha, to secure white domination in South
Africa via improving state security in Southern Africa (Alden 1996).
The outlines of that grand plan was first enunciated by the new Prime Minister P. W. Botha to the
NP Congress in October 1979. However, it was a vision which was developing within the NP
leadership, and even amongst the black homeland leadership in the late 1970s (Starcke 1978). The
essence of that vision was that Southern Africa in the year 2000 would encompass a constellation
of states within which the various races and ethnic groups would be accommodated. The
principles of this constellation were either federal, or even better confederal, and who would
cooperate on issues of mutual concerns, particularly economic and security ones. Both the
Frontline states and the homelands formed part of this constellation. Citizenship was dual: a
Southern African citizenship which allowed everyone to live and work wherever they want; and
citizenship of a state, homeland, province, city-state, or canton wherein they vote (Starcke pp. 19-
21). This vision was what guided state-led reform of the 1980s. Of course, elements of the vision
were open to alternative interpretations by various factions of the NP elite, who in turn could be
pressured one way or another by various constituencies within the staU and polity. Differing
interpretations of the vision led to the NP split in 1982 and its subsequent transformation, while
the implementation of the vision precipitated militant popular resistance under the rubric of the
UDF.
The initiative for constitutional reform had begun under the leadership of Prime Minister Vorster
who established the Theron Commission. Although his government rejected the recommendations
of the commission for the direct representation of Coloureds in the state, he did establish a cabinet
committee to investigate further. P. W. Botha, who was then minister of defense, chaired the
committee. Also on the committee was Connie Mulder, leader of the Transvaal NP, the largest
and most conservative wing of the party. The committee's proposals were announced in August
of 1977 and were endorsed at the party's four provincial congresses in that year. In essence, they
entailed the establishment of three separate houses of parliament empowered to legislate on 'own
affairs'. Matters of 'general affairs' would be dealt with through a Council of Cabinets in which
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all three groups would be represented and would legislate by consensus. Also proposed was an
executive state president elected by an electoral college. The houses of parliament were based on
the demographic numbers of whites (4), Coloureds (2) and Indians (1), which in effect meant that
the white parliament would be able to dominate numerically should legislation face opposition in
the other parliaments. Each parliament would be able to elect its own Prime Minister, though the
white parliament would elect the President. Additionally, the proposals suggested a multiracial
President's Council, separate regional councils, and separate municipal councils for towns which
qualified. The proposals represented, not an abandonment of apartheid, but the extension of racial
divisions to all levels of the state (Sarakinsky 1992, pp. 8-10). That explains why they were
acceptable to all members of the party.
The proposals were never implemented because the state could not find Coloureds and Indians
to serve in the separate institutions (personal interviews 1996)5. The state put the proposals on
ice in the midst of the leadership struggles surrounding the Information scandal in which the
Department of Information, headed by Mulder, had abused funds for the purpose of promoting
South Africa internationally. P.W. Botha successfully used the Information Scandal to win the
leadership of the party from Mulder. Botha then referred the proposals to another committee, and
this committee along with the newly formed President's Council drafted legislation for a new
constitution. These proposals were very similar to those drafted earlier, but contained some
significant differences. First, instead of separate parliaments, there was now one parliament with
separate houses, each to deliberate over 'own affairs' but to meet jointly in matters of'general
affairs.' In addition, instead of separate regional and local government institutions, the state aimed
to modify Black local authorities in line with the Wiehahn and Riekert commissions' acceptance
of urban blacks as insiders in white South Africa. In effect, the changes signified a willingness to
adapt the underlying philosophy of separate development, and it was to this that the verkramptes
disagreed. In February of 1982, the NP split and the Conservative Party was formed later that
year. In July of 1982, Botha announced at the NP Federal Congress that the party had a set of
proposals they were ready to support, and he put them to the white electorate in a referendum in
1983. With the orthodox ideologues out of the NP, there was room for new thinking, and the
vertigtes pushed ahead with the implementation of the Tricamera! parliament; most were
oblivious to the confrontation that it would evoke.
A. State Reform 'from above* and (Limited) Revolution Against Racism from Below.
Black insurgency involved the unfolding of three successive stages of political action, each
leading to the dominance of particular ideologies and organizations. First, there was the
students uprising of 1976 which began in Soweto and spread rapidly to many townships in
the country. The uprising lasted approximately a year. It was sparked by a decision of the
5
 I am unable to provide names of interview sources at this stage of my research, but they will be
available in later more finished writings.
Minister of National Education, Andries Treurnicht, later to be leader of the Conservative
Party of the Far Right, to require that African students to be instructed in Afrikaans.
Interestingly, the rebellion spread to the Colored community in the Western Cape, where
over 20,000 students were involved in confrontations with the state. Most of these students
were native speakers of Afrikaans. Colored involvement suggests that the issue of Afrikaans
was really superficial; underneath that lay the effects of black consciousness (BC) in
creating a new racial assertiveness to an urban youth denied access to wealth, property,
security and the state (Marx 1992). By creating a black identity with positive overtones, BC
made possible cross-racial opposition to the state. The fact that some Coloreds joined the
anti-apartheid struggle is very significant, since the apartheid state had attempted to
cultivate an identity of relative privilege with respect to Africans (Horowitz 1991; Marx
1992; Price 1991).
BC politicized a whole generation of young blacks, some of whom were jailed by the state.
Others fled to ANC camps in exile. In both places, the ANC's tradition of non-racialism
was influential. The ANC infiltrated some of its new recruits back into the country with the
aim of promoting civil organizations which would oppose the state (Barrell 1991). The
indirect and direct influence of the ANC culminated in the formation of the UDF in 1983.
At inception, the UDF had over 550 member organizations. At its height, it was in the
region of 800. UDF mobilized initially around material concerns. By 1985, it was to
broaden these to include one national political goal: democratize the state by ending
apartheid (Alden 1996; Marx 1991).
UDF's success was in large part attributable to its inclusiveness of organization and
ideology. It recruited members from all races and classes. Its collaboration with whites and
black petty bourgeois organizations often led to material gains at the cost of the emergence
of a relatively privileged and more conservative elite. In revolutionary terms, the UDF was
a victim of its own success. UDF did pose the most sustained revolutionary challenge to
the state, and it was only in the late 1980s that the state was able to curtail its power
through repression (Alden 1996; Marx 1992; Price 1991). UDF's real contribution was to
fuse the assertiveness of the black consciousness movement with the non-racial tradition of
the ANC in calling for the democratization of the state and society (Frederikse 1990; Marx
1991). UDF rediscovered non-racialism and then dispersed it throughout the county's
townships with successful organization, although there is evidence that its reach in the
townships was confined largely to the activist leadership (person interviews 1997). Non-
racialism was also influential in certain white circles. Universities, in particular, became
sites of cross-racial collaboration in struggle against the state.
The third stage of black resistance was the union movement. COSATU formed through the
merger of the non-racial Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and the
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in 1985. COSATU's paid-up membership was
around Vi million at inception, rising to well over a million by 1990. The unions had
developed through a decade-and-a-half struggle to build strong and democratic shop-floor
organizations. They had not entered politics because of the potential threats this might pose
to their continued existence. Finally, in the late 1980s, the UDF also succeeded in goading
COSATU into politics. The unions played a far more strategic politics than UDF, using
large scale strikes and boycotts to pressure the NP regime to democratize. COSATU also
used pressure to get the NP regime, and eventually the ANC, to adopt more pro-worker
legislation (Alden 1996; Seidman 1994). COSATU's real impact on politics is now only
beginning to be felt in the development of the social-democratic compromises. It was
crucial in shifting the central ideological focus of black politics from UDF's populist non-
racialism to a workerist non-racialism.
Overall, South African black politics is unique in the African context. The three movements
mentioned above all reveal an urban bias, being organized primarily amongst the working
classes broadly defined. UDF and COSATU are distinct from BC in their stress on non-
racial inclusivism, and their attempts, partially successful, in creating internally democratic
organizations.
B. Aborted State Reform from Above and the Creation of Political Stalemate
How did black insurgency impact the strategies of the state and the perceptions of the state
elite? State reform of the late 1970's and early 1980s was aimed at co-opting sectors of the
black population. The Tricameral parliament was the first such attempt, with a three houses
for white, Coloured and Indian South Africans respectively. Tricameralism was a bold attempt
to co-opt Coloureds and Indians while still maintaining white control of power at the center.
It was for this reason primarily that the fourth house for Africans was scrapped early on in the
development of the new constitution; there was no way to constitutionally guarantee white
power and maintain white democracy. To have solved this problem would have required that
the state implement separate houses for each racial grouping, a possibility preempted by
boycotts by the prospective co-optees of the Indian and Coloured houses. Furthermore, it
would have required that the state take seriously the possibility that the bantustans were not
the solution to African separate development. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, this was not
the case: the state was not willing to concede that the bantustans were already a failure, and
this is most clearly indicated in the adoption of the Riekeit and Wiehahn insider/outside
dichotomy noted earlier. The fact that African insiders did not have political representation
was a problem, but one that was to be dealt with after the implementation of the Tricameral
parliament (Heunis 1983, col. 7053; personal interviews 1996).
Tricameralism opened the space for political mobilization from below, and it was in that space
that UDF was formed. Nationally, the agenda of the UDF was to oppose the Tricameral
parliament. Almost immediately after the implementation of the Tricameral Parliamentary
elections, the townships in the industrial heartland erupted in violence. The levels of unrest
were unprecedented in the history of the country. Perhaps the best indicator of the extent of
problem it posed for the state is in the levels of repression to which the state had to respond
to quell the uprising. In 1983, there were 453 detentions, 1985 1.129, 1986 7.992, 1987
29.132. Members of the state's security apparatus were obviously and justifiably concerned.
When they plotted these figures on a monthly basis, the projections in 1986 for 1986 and
beyond were horrendous: the revolution which has always been forecast by pessimists was
upon them! (personal interviews 1996). They had to do something.
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It was in the context of this violence and state repression that the willingness of the state to
hold African exclusion as sacrosanct was undermined. This is most clearly evident in the
pattern of constitutional proposals which the state placed on the table. In respect of the
African population, the state's reform efforts were until 1985 all organized within the logic of
apartheid: that Africans do not have citizenship rights in white South Africa because they are
citizens of the bantustans. Hence the local government reforms of the early 1980s which led
to the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. This act established town councils in the African
townships of 'white' South Africa and granted them authority to administer local affairs
(Alden 1996, p. 131). It was the participants in these town councils who became the prime
targets for UDF insurgencies. At the same time, the state proceeded with the formation of
multi-racial provincial and regional government formations for whites, Indians and Coloureds.
This culminated in the Promotion of Local Government Affairs Amendment Act of 1985
which created a single local government for whites, Coloureds and Indians. There was no hint
of including Africans in these multiracial bodies at the time in May 1985. By February 1986,
the government had come full circle on this and had called for the direct representation of
Africans in all levels of provincial government (Alden 1996, p. 136). In less than one year,
coinciding with the period of most intense insurgency, the government had abandoned the
central principle underlying its program of constitutional reform to date.
Unfortunately for the state, multiracial provincial government found no more legitimacy in the
eyes of the black population, and it was pressured to continue searching for a solution to the
problem or black inclusion and maintaining white power. At the same time that the
government called for the inclusion of Africans into provincial government, Minister Heunis
announced a bill to create a National Council, a forum which would negotiate a new
constitution (less than three years after the implementation of the last 'new constitution.' The
forum was to be used to bring Africans in particular into the constitutional negotiating process
(Heunis 1988, pp. 229-234). The Council was stillborn, since the state could not find suitable
negotiating partners to participate in drafting a new constitution. This was primarily because
the state wanted to nominate its negotiating partners. Hence the National Statutory Council
Bill arrived in parliament as 36 member body, of which the President could appoint 8. Other
appointees were 6 homeland leaders, 9 urban black community representatives elected by
electoral college in 9 regions, four provincial administrators, 3 chairs of ministers councils in
parliament, Minister of Constitutional Development, and up to 5 other ministers (Pottinger
1988, p. 128). Even Mangosuthu Buthelezi, at the time seen as a moderate homeland leader
and essential to the success of any further negotiations, would not participate. His own public
response to such overtures was: "[If] the State President turns his national council into a
castration chamber then only those who aspire to be political eunuchs will want to go there
(Smith 1988, p, 236).
Unable to get negotiating partners of substance, the state lost its political initiative in the arena
of constitutional reforms. Underlying this loss of initiative was an unwillingness by the state
abandon white monopoly of political power at the center. Hence the pattern in which state
reforms ensued: first constitutional reforms concentrated on securing black local government
participation, then regional government, and finally central government solutions were
proposed. Each step represented a defensive retreat by the state in maintaining white power
at the center. In the event, as long as the state maintained a commitment to a racial division
of powers, it was unable to find legitimate negotiating partners, A stalemate developed in 1987
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which was only broken under the new leadership of de Klerk in 1990 who was willing to
negotiate with the African National Congress.
C. Insurgency, and Pre and Covert Negotiations.
Up till now, I have treated the state as a unity. This has been to show central state response
to pressures from civil society. It would be incorrect to assume that such a unity existed. In
fact, the state was profoundly divided, right up to the level of cabinet. It was these divisions
which eventually made the ascendance of de Klerk and a negotiation strategy possible.
The first set of direct contacts between the ANC and state occurred in November of 1985
when the Minister of Justice, Koebie Coetsee, responded to one of Mandela's many requests
for a meeting. It was an informal meeting precipitated by the ongoing unrest (personal
interviews). Links were then established between Mandela's lawyer and the ANC in exile
(Sparks 1994, 21-31). In March of 1986, the state sent a three person delegation to meet the
ANC in Paris. These South African delegation included Mike Louw, the second in charge of
National Intelligence, and Thabo Mbeki of the ANC (Seegers 1996, p. 245). In May of 1988,
Coetsee formed a special committee to broaden discussions with Mandela. The team includes
NIS head and deputy head Niel Barnard and Louw, Commissioner of Prisons, General
Willemse, director-general of prisons Fanus van der Merwe, and Coetsee himself. Mandela's
diary records 47 such meetings. Mandela recognized Barnard as the key strategist of the
group. Barnard was to assess Mandela's thinking on three issues: violence, his support for, or
belief in, communism, and majority rule versus power-sharing (Sparks 1994, p. 36-48).
Eventually, it was National Intelligence who was to organize the fist direct talks with the ANC
in London, and then make the arrangements to have the exiles return to commence
negotiations.
Part of the problem in attempting to explain the origins and development of democratization
is to understand what happened in these talks, and who in the cabinet and state more generally
knew about them. The conventional understanding is that the talks were kept underwraps,
known only to those directly involved, Botha, and perhaps one or two others (Sparks 1994).
My own information suggests that this is an overly simplified view, that many other cabinet
ministers knew about them and had wanted to get involved. The most obvious person not
included was Chris Heunis and his department: it was, after all, the constitutional think-tank
of the state. The possible reasons for Heunis' exclusion are manifold. Fist, there was the reality
of turf-battles in the state between Coetsee as head of Justice with legal access to Mandela,
and Heunis (personal interviews). Second, there was the problem that Heunis had as the
Minister who had developed a constitution which had led to so much violence. Botha never
could forgive him for this, and he became persona non grata in the cabinet (personal
interviews). Third, there was evidence that Heunis' department had come to fundamentally
different conclusions about how to proceed with reform than those closest to Botha.
Botha had always relied closely on the military, and especially on military intelligence for
formulating strategic responses to insurgency (Seegers 1996). Military Intelligence had come
to view the conflict through the eyes of counter-insurgency theory. Essential to this was the
12
notion that the country was being subjected to a Total Onslaught, a conflict against every level
of society being inspired, organized and supported by communist agitators in the townships.
These agitators were then linked to the communist-dominated ANC who was in turn
controlled by the Soviet Union. The logical solution was then to eliminate the conspirators in
the townships and then deal with the problems of development though co-option (personal
interviews).
As early as January 1985, leading constitutional thinkers of the Department of Constitutional
Development and Planning had a different assessment. Their position was eventually published
in a document entitled Ons Skrik vir Niks (We Are Not Afraid of Anything) in March of 1987.
The document suggested that repression was counter-productive in that it led to the
emergence of more radical, and often corruptible leadership (personal interviews, Seegers
1996, p. 248-9). Instead the department suggested that it would be better to unban political
organizations and remove the unenforceable aspects of Apartheid (Seegers 1996, p. 249). The
document was supported by over 20 members of the civil service and some in the cabinet
(Mail and Guardian, October 11-17, 1996). It died a quick death, ostensibly by Botha, and
eventually led to the removal of security clearances for two members of the Department of
Constitutional Development.
In this context, National Intelligence requested a briefing by one of those relieved of their
security clearance. They wanted to understand the potential benefits to negotiation. They had
also, after the many visits with Mandela contact with the ANC in exile, come to the conclusion
that continued repression was more costly that beneficial (personal interviews). In addition,
they had been able to see past the Total Onslaught ideology which so dominated military
thinking. Mandela was not a communist, the ANC was not controlled by communists though
there many communists in the ANC leadership. And the USSR was changing its position on
supporting revolutionary nationalist movements to one for negotiation (Seegers 1996, p. 249).
Having come to this conclusion, the problem was to get Botha to meet Mandela
unconditionally (personal interviews 1997). When this was eventually achieved, it July of
1989, it was of no significance, for other events had overtaken Botha and the securocrats.
Two changes were crucial in this regard. First, South Africa had eventually agreed to a
negotiated settlement in Angola and the independence of Namibia. The significance of this
settlement was in the removal of 35,000 Cuban troops and the moderate outcome of the
settlement. Second was the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Combined, these undermined the
ability of the securocrats to argue with any conviction that the USSR, was leading a Total
Onslaught against the state. At the same time, it strengthened the hand of the verligtes in the
cabinet and state who saw this as the key opportunity to unban the ANC and commence
negotiations (personal interviews). Botha, though, remained unconvinced. Interestingly, in a
1995 interview with Botha conducted by Financial Times correspondent, Patti Waldmeir
(1997), Botha reiterates his belief that Mandela was and is a communist, and that the state
entered negotiations from a position of weakness rather than strength. It is highly unlikely,
therefore, that had Botha remained in power, he would have taken the state to the negotiating
table in the manner of de Klerk.
But nature intervened. Botha took ill. Botha in an effort to diminish his workload resigned his
position as head of party. In a narrow victory, de Klerk, the archtypical party centrist, took
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over. Using his position as leader of the party, he deliberately flouted Botha's leadership as
head of the state and led a delegation to a number of Frontline states. An enraged Botha called
an emergency cabinet meeting, and then one by one, the cabinet told him it was time for him
to go (on the grounds of his waning health). Botha resigned, on public television, after a
rambling speech denouncing his own party leadership. De Klerk took over, and in the last
months of 1989, made the necessary arrangements to unban the ANC in his opening speech
of parliament in 1990. Although the current thinking on the matter suggests that de Klerk was
unaware of the secret negotiations with the ANC, there is good reason to believe that this is
not the case. National Intelligence was probably pressurizing Botha to meet Mandela as early
as 1988, perhaps 1987. They probably realized that he was not going to do it, and then cast
around for a way out of dilemma. There is some evidence to suggest that some cabinet
members and the Broederbond were thinking of a coup against Botha as early as 1986 (Sparks
1994, p 75). Coetsee was the leading cabinet member who organized what was really s silent
coup (Personal interviews 1997). My suspicion is that National Intelligence had come to
conclusion that Botha had to go, and they collaborated with Coetsee. They also knew that the
most likely successor to Botha was de Klerk as leader of the largest wing to the party. 1
suspect that they had informed de Klerk of their activities prior to his ascendance to head of
state, and perhaps even prior to becoming leader of the party. Such a position would be
consistent with how de Klerk relied on National Intelligence in the post 1990 era, moving
Barnard to head of Constitutional Development where he organized and oversaw the
governments negotiating team. National Intelligence was also used to spy on Military
Intelligence and gather information leading to the purge of 23 military generals accused of
human rights abuses (personal interviews 1997). Either way, it was a "miracle" of sorts that
de Klerk did become president because it was only he who could hold the cabinet together in
the post 1990 transitional phase with his tremendous powers of persuasion and his firm base
in the party (personal interviews 1996).
D. Providing the Inclusive Path Out of Stalemate.
The focus of this paper is not so much on the range of pressures which brought the state to
negotiate but on what made the negotiations possible in such a deeply divided county. Most
important in this regard has been the tradition of non-racialism in the ANC. As far back as
1955 in the ANC's famous document. The Freedom Charter, the ANC had advocated a
position which suggested that the future South Africa should be democratic and that it
"belongs to all who live in her, black and white alike."
UDF resurrected that non-racialism and dispersed it far more widely though the townships and
nationally through its campaigns. Non-racialism was also influential in certain white circles.
Universities, in particular, became sites of cross-racial collaboration in the struggle against the
state. UDF's primary concerns with organizational cohesion led to a need for mobilizing
resources. Many white organizations, business, churches, and foreign donor organizations
were crucial in making this organizational growth a possibility. For example, in 1987, the
UDF's own budget was over R2 million, with over R200 million donated by various groups
to its affiliates (Marx 1992, p. 144). UDF and its affiliates signaled the birth of a civil society
operating independently of the state, and capable of developing its own views and institutions.
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In the mid 1980s, under pressure from the UDF, the union movement finally entered politics.
With its ability to organize strikes, the movement was able to step into the breech when state
repression had diminished the capacities of the UDF. More importantly, the UDF led to the
development of a young leadership schooled in the ideology of non-racialism, and familiar with
its practice by virtue of the cross-racial collective action which successful organization building
required (personal interviews 1997). Finally, both UDF and the unions made class and
developmental concerns primary to their day-to-day demands. UDF was important in
demanding community level upgrading from the state, while the unions advocated demands
for higher wages and other workers' benefits. Neither of these were particularly threatening
to white material interests (except for white workers in lower paid jobs), and not threatening
at all to white national interests. The principle axes of conflict in the 1980s was thus
asymmetrical. It was not a conflict predominated by two competing nationalisms with demands
for separate territory, recognition of separate identities and so on. While there were clearly
concerns of identity on the part of the National Party and the white minority, identities was not
central to mobilization from below.
The importance of this asymmetry was clear in the formal negotiations where non-racialism
meant the national rights of whites was uncontested (Sisk 1995). One member of the state's
covert negotiating team with Mandela and the ANC expressed it to me as follows:
Non-racialism was very important in finding a solution to the conflict in the country. Our
interactions with the ANC leadership inside and outside [the country] demonstrated clearly to
us that, while we disagreed with the ANC on many matters, especially on the nature of the
economy, we would be accepted by them in and ANC government. Our interactions with the
PAC did not reflect this acceptance (personal interviews 1996).
Instead interviewees have remarked on the mutual love for South Africa found in the ANC and
their cultural commonness (Sparks 1994; Waldmeir 1997). These perceptions of the ANC
leadership in NP elite circles are usefully contrasted with those of the Pan Africanist Congress
(PAC). The PAC has contested the national rights of whites, and has been a reluctant
participant in the negotiations process, maintaining a revolutionary rhetoric and strategy until
1993. Its dismal results in the 1994 elections suggest that most black South Africans reject its
anti-white nationalism, and provides a useful test of the import of non-racialism. Had the PAC
been the leading black opposition, NP elites have suggested that South Africa would have
"ended up like Bosnia."
4. Democratization and National Identity.
Many scholars have noted the intimate relationship between nationalism and democracy
(Greenfeld 1992; Mann 1994). Here the path of most states of Western Europe are perhaps the
ideal type. Nations form in the context of modernization (Anderson 1991; Mann 1994) and are
incorporated into the modern bureaucratic state (Mann 1994; Smith 1991). Crucial here is the
development of an inclusive form of mobilization and incorporation. Yet not all states in Europe,
or even Western Europe have traveled along this inclusive path. Germany is one case in point
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where the construction of the polity along lines of familial descent was crucial to the formation
of the authoritarian and fascist state (Brubaker 1992).
South Africa includes both of these paths. Afrikaner nationalism, was of the latter type, but was
based on race and language not descent, and was institutionalized a racially exclusive polity. The
Pan Africanist Congress developed an anti-colonial discourse and movement, and
approximated—inversely— the exclusivism of the apartheid state. In the latter part of the 20*
Century, and after a period of intensive modernization, a more inclusive movement emerged. The
principle agency for that inclusive nationalism, and thus democratization, was the insurgency of
the black community. Conflict modernization theorists, for example, have a tendency to totalize
the conflict, not recognizing the differences between the PAC/ANC and NP/CP camps. Giliomee,
for example, reduces those ideological differences to one of strategy (1989).
And yet, nothing could be more inaccurate. Had the Far Right dominated the power struggles in
the 1980s within the party, South Africa could never have transited to democracy. The evidence
for this is clear: the Far Right, for the most part, did not participate in the negotiation process.
They have continuously pressed claims for a separate state. And after the recent adoption of the
new constitution by the NP, ANC and numerous other parties, Far Right leaders condemned it
as "selling out of the white man."
Similarly, the PAC has, only in late 1996, accepted the new constitution, with reservations. Prior
to this it had argued that it protects "settler" interests over those of Africans.
Hence South African democratization is startling because it occurred in what was conventionally
seen as a deeply divided society. However, modernization set the structural context for
undermining much of those divisions by bringing blacks and whites into interdependent relations
in a capitalist economy. The insurgencies of the 1980s then shifted much of the political terrain
in line with those larger structural changes, setting in place the possibilities of a non-racial path
of nation building within an inclusive democracy. South Africa's politics resembles the ideal-type
divided society less. Hence, unlike conflict modernization theorists who saw in South Africa
useful comparison with divided states like Israel, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, I argue that the
politics of the 1980s made those comparisons less relevant (though no less interesting). Better
comparisons are with Latin America and South Korea. However, the general pattern of
democratization in these regions has been dominated by elite reform from above, rather than
insurgency from below. Hence the power that the key organization in the ancien regime, the
military, still plays in politics in Latin America, or the limited authority of parliament in South
Korea (Seidman 1994). On the other extreme have been cases of revolution. Here the state has
collapsed, and the old regime was swept away by tides of insurgency (Moore 1966; Skocpol
1980). It is in the intermediate cases that South Africa finds its most compelling comparisons
(Burton and Higley 1987). Democratization occurs when elites give way to some demands from
below. Perhaps most instructive here is the case of England, where the Chartist movement forced
a progressive expansion of the franchise upon conservative elites (Mann 1994). The comparisons
suggest that relative balance of forces in democratization processes will impact the meaning of
the future democracy. In state-led democratization, democracy is likely to be corporatist with
party competition regulated by the pact. In mass-led democratization, democracy is likely to be
more competitive, and its future failure or success dependent upon developing a social contract
(Karl 1990; Przeworski 1991).
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